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I. INTRODUCTION 
In his book about the financial crisis that led to the so-called 
“Great Recession,” Michael Lewis tells the story of Michael Burry, a 
short-seller who realized that many subprime mortgage bonds were 
worthless if the inevitable happened—if home prices leveled off.1 
Home prices did not need to actually fall for the financial meltdown 
to occur; they simply needed to level off. Models that valued 
subprime home loan-based derivatives did not reveal the extent of the 
risk because the models could not account for stable or falling home 
prices. Burry assumed that once this information became widespread, 
the market for these risky derivatives would collapse.2 To his surprise, 
even when the insight was widely shared, the party continued for 
years. By then, many individuals and institutions were too heavily 
invested in not seeing that the emperor had no clothes to change 
course before the meltdown began.3 
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 1. See MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT 47–48 (2010) (discussing efforts of Mike Burry 
to create a derivative to bet against the subprime mortgage bond market). 
 2. Id. at 47 (noting Burry’s concern that “[i]t’s going to blow up before I can get this trade 
on”). See also Michael J. Burry, I Saw the Crisis Coming. Why Didn’t the Fed?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
3, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/04/opinion/04burry.html. 
 3. See, e.g., Michiyo Nakamoto & David Wighton, Citigroup Head Stays Bullish on Buy-
Outs, FIN. TIMES, July 9, 2007, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/80e2987a-2e50-11dc-821c-
0000779fd2ac.html#axzz1VsCLE220 (quoting Citigroup chief executive officer Charles Prince 
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We had a reaction similar to Burry’s the first time we read one of 
Harvard economist Martin Weitzman’s articles on the failure to 
include fat tailed risks in the leading integrated assessment models 
(IAMs) of climate change costs and benefits.4 The aspect of climate 
change most worthy of substantial attention by anyone interested in 
rational risk regulation is the existence of catastrophic, irreversible 
outcomes.5 Small shifts in rainfall or temperature may or may not be 
worthy of regulatory expenditures, but they do not pose core, long-
term threats. Peer-reviewed publications by paleoclimatologists and 
climate scientists suggest, however, that there are disturbingly high 
likelihoods of temperature increases and sea level rises that could 
cause the kinds of systemic failures that almost brought down the 
financial system in 2008.6 
Weitzman pointed out as early as 2007 that the state-of-the-art 
IAMs did not account for fat-tailed catastrophes. He later formalized 
his analysis in his Dismal Theorem, which proved that unlike normal, 
 
for the proposition that “as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance. We’re 
still dancing.”). 
 4. See Martin L. Weitzman, A Review of The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate 
Change, 45 J. ECON. LITERATURE 703, 720 (2007); Martin L. Weitzman, On Modeling and 
Interpreting the Economics of Catastrophic Climate Change, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1, 2 (2009). 
For an early reaction, see Michael P. Vandenbergh, Brooke Ackerly & Fred Forster, Micro-
Offsets and Macro-Transformation: An Inconvenient View of Climate Change Justice, 33 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 303, 317–19 (2009). 
 5. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 43–58 (2007) 
(discussing the possibility of abrupt climate change and noting the existence of “a number of 
ominous feedback possibilities”); Robert H. Socolow, High-Consequence Outcomes and Internal 
Disagreements: Tell Us More, Please, CLIMATIC CHANGE (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 1–
2), available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/00318p08511j9164/ (stating that “I assume 
that Objective Number One for anyone in the policy-making community is to form an 
independent judgment of how urgent the climate problem is. Does the world need to drop 
everything else and assign climate change the highest priority, or is climate change one of 
several important problems?”). The notion that some environmental problems require distinct 
responses because they are irreversible is not new to the economics literature. See, e.g., Kenneth 
J. Arrow & Anthony C. Fisher, Environmental Preservation, Uncertainty, and Irreversibility, 88 
Q.J. ECON. 312, 318 (1974). 
 6. See, e.g., Richard A. Betts et al., When Could Global Warming Reach 4°C?, 369 PHIL. 
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A, 67, 67 (2011) (predicting a temperature rise of 7°F relative to 
preindustrial times by 2060 to 2070); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 795, 1704 (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 
2007) [hereinafter IPCC PHYSICAL SCIENCE] (concluding that global warming will be 
irreversible for thousands of years and carries significant risks of sustained droughts as bad or 
worse than the 1930s dust bowl and covering much of the world); Steven C. Sherwood & 
Matthew Huber, An Adaptability Limit to Climate Change Due to Heat Stress, 107 PROC. NAT’L. 
ACAD. SCI. 9552, 9552 (2010) (predicting that amounts of warming predicted by several model 
simulations could well cause sporadic heat waves affecting large fractions of the populated areas 
of the planet that would kill anyone without access to air conditioning). 
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thin-tailed risks, the fat tails of uncertainty about the consequences of 
climate change cause the expected damages to be dominated by low-
probability catastrophes: “The economics of fat-tailed catastrophes 
raises difficult conceptual issues that cause the analysis to appear less 
scientifically conclusive and more contentiously subjective than what 
comes out of an empirical CBA [cost–benefit analysis] of more thin-
tailed situations. But if this is the way things are with fat tails, then 
this is the way things are. . . . . Perhaps in the end the climate-change 
economist can help most by not presenting a cost-benefit estimate . . . 
as if it is accurate and objective.”7 In the last several years, legal 
scholars have begun to examine the implications of Weitzman’s 
concerns for climate change laws and policies.8 
In addition, it has become increasingly apparent that tipping 
points may well exist, points beyond which catastrophic outcomes will 
be difficult if not impossible to prevent. For example, a recent expert 
elicitation study suggests that there is a greater than fifty percent 
probability that the earth’s climate system will cross an irreversible 
tipping point by the year 2100 if we continue on a business-as-usual 
trajectory.9 The tipping points discussed in these studies do not refer 
 
 7.  Weitzman, On Modeling and Interpreting, supra note 4, at 18. See also Jonathan S. 
Masur & Eric A. Posner, Climate Regulation and the Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis 32–33 
(John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 525, 2010), available at http:// 
www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/525-315-jm-eap-climate.pdf (noting that quantitative cost-
benefit analysis is of little if any use in managing climate change risks because of both the 
enormous scientific uncertainties and the inseparability of scientific questions from normative 
or political ones). 
 8.  See, e.g., Jody Freeman & Andrew Guzman, Climate Change and U.S. Interests, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 1521, 1554 (2009) (discussing treatment of fat-tailed risks in IAMs); 
Vandenbergh, Ackerly & Forster, supra note 4, at 317–19 (examining implications of fat-tailed 
risks for climate policy); Masur & Posner, supra note 7, at 19 (noting that IAMs may be 
“underestimating the probability of catastrophic events by significant margins”); Daniel A. 
Farber, Uncertainty, 99 GEO. L.J. 901, 923–27 (2011) (discussing fat-tailed distributions and 
catastrophic outcomes). See also Jody Freeman & Andrew Guzman, A Reply, 41 ENVTL. L. 
REP. 10,726, 10,728 (2011) (noting that IAMs “systematically understate the economic effects of 
climate change” because of their omission of several categories of harm, including catastrophic 
events). 
 9.  Kirsten Zickfeld et al., Expert Judgments about Transient Climate Response to 
Alternative Future Trajectories of Radiative Forcing, 107 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 12,451, 
12,452–53 (2010) (reporting that thirteen of  fourteen experts assigned a probability greater than 
0.5 to the climate system undergoing or becoming irrevocably committed to “a fundamental 
state change” by 2100 under a high-emissions scenario similar to the historically observed 
trajectory, with nine of the fourteen assigning a probability greater than ninety percent; eight of 
the fourteen assigned a probability greater than fifty percent even for a “medium” trajectory, in 
which drastic emissions curtailment would stabilize atmospheric CO2 at 550 parts per million by 
2100). See also Elmar Kriegler et al., Imprecise Probability Assessment of Tipping Points in the 
Climate System, 106 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 5041, 5041 (2009) (reporting “conservative lower 
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specifically to catastrophes large enough to end civilization, but they 
do represent significant, abrupt, and irreversible changes in the 
climate system that would have dramatic global impacts. In addition, 
greenhouse gas emissions over the next several decades may make it 
impossible to avoid some tipping points, even if emissions are 
dramatically curtailed in subsequent years.10 Although most tipping 
points discussed in the literature may not lead to catastrophic harms, 
there is no method to rigorously determine CO2 concentrations 
corresponding to tipping points, and classes of tipping points may 
exist that have not yet been identified in the scientific literature. The 
problem is not one of known thresholds for catastrophic harm, but 
one of uncertainty and ignorance surrounding a real but 
indeterminate possibility for irreversible global catastrophe. 
We believe that reducing the likelihood of truly catastrophic 
outcomes should be a central goal of any system designed to achieve 
rational risk management. That may appear to be an obvious 
proposition, but as we will discuss, the risk-assessment and risk-
management communities are not functioning as if that is the central 
goal. We also believe that the existence of unknown but plausible 
tipping points supports a sense of urgency regarding risk assessment 
and risk management. 
We might have expected a rational risk-management system to 
respond to the Weitzman analysis with an effort to find better ways to 
treat fat-tailed uncertainty about catastrophic risks and to introduce 
those new assessments into regulatory analysis and policy debates 
about climate change. The growing concern about tipping points 
might have induced the risk-management system to move quickly to 
incorporate these fat-tailed risks into the analysis. The response could 
have involved modifying traditional cost–benefit techniques to 
account for these outcomes. It could have involved supplementing or 
replacing cost–benefit analysis of climate change with other 
 
bounds for the probability of triggering at least 1 [tipping point event] of . . . 0.56 for high global 
mean temperature change (above 4 °C) relative to year 2000 levels”). 
 10. Johan Rockstrom et al., A Safe Operating Space for Humanity, 461 NATURE 472, 473 
(2009) (noting that a number of tipping points probably lie within the range of 350 to 550 parts 
per million of CO2; the current concentration of CO2 is roughly 390 parts per million); 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: 
THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS 222 fig.3.12 (John T. Houghton et al. eds., 2001), and supplementary 
online data at http://www.ipcc-data.org/ancilliary/tar-bern.txt and http://www.ipcc-
data.org/ancilliary/tar-isam.txt (showing that three of the six major emissions scenarios produce 
CO2 concentrations of 550 ppm or more by 2060). See also Timothy M. Lenton et al., Tipping 
Points in the Earth’s Climate System, 105 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 1786, 1788 (2008) (providing 
detailed tipping point assessment). 
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techniques that account for these outcomes and are likely to carry 
appropriate weight in regulatory and policy decision-making. Or, at a 
minimum, it could have included prominent, full disclosure of the 
limitations of the analysis in ways likely to affect the policy debate. 
Unfortunately, that did not happen. The response to Weitzman’s 
analysis bears an uncanny resemblance to the response of financial 
institutions to unwanted information about the risks of mortgage-
backed securities. Some criticized the points made by Weitzman and 
other critics of climate cost–benefit analysis as just a rehash of 
previous arguments over precautionary versus cost–benefit 
approaches to environmental policy.11 Others faulted Weitzman for 
placing too high a value on preventing the permanent destruction of 
civilization.12 Others acknowledged the limited treatment of tail risks 
but only conducted limited additional sensitivity analyses or argued 
that the catastrophic tail of the climate risk distribution was not 
nearly as fat as Weitzman had presumed.13 
 
 11. See, e.g., Gary W. Yohe & Richard S.J. Tol, Precaution and the Dismal Theorem: 
Implications for Climate Policy and Climate Research (Working Paper FNU-145, Sustainability 
& Global Change Research Unit, Hamburg Univ., 2007), available at http:// 
econpapers.repec.org/paper/sgcwpaper/145.htm (arguing that if the Dismal Theorem implies an 
extremely precautionary policy response to fat-tailed risks, then there is no way to set priorities 
among multiple fat-tailed risks, but also sharing this Article’s conclusion that the Dismal 
Theorem does imply an urgent need to develop better ways of understanding and rationally 
treating fat-tailed macro risks). 
 12. See, e.g., Robert S. Pindyck, Fat Tails, Thin Tails, and Climate Change Policy 4 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16353, 2010) (arguing that if the extinction of 
the human race, including “the end for future generations” is valued at a large but finite 
multiple of the value of statistical life, “the dismal theorem no longer holds”); William D. 
Nordhaus, An Analysis of the Dismal Theorem 6–7, 12–14 (Cowles Found. Discussion Paper No. 
1686, 2009) (analyzing other examples of potential catastrophes and concluding that “societies 
do not behave as if catastrophic outcomes have unbounded negative disutility”). But see Martin 
Weitzman, Reactions to the Nordhaus Critique 8–14 (Harvard Envtl. Econ. Program Discussion 
Paper No. 09-11, 2009) (arguing that replacing the infinite value of the value of civilization or 
the human race with “an uncomfortably large, but finite number” does not remove the Dismal 
Theorem’s conclusion that for fat-tailed risks, rational willingness to pay will be dominated by 
low-probability catastrophes even when “the most catastrophic extremes are unlikely ever to 
materialize”). 
 13. See, e.g., Nordhaus, supra note 12, at 8–12 (criticizing Weitzman’s method of calculating 
tail risk). But see Weitzman, supra note 12, at 5 (noting that “[c]ontrary to what Nordhaus 
states, my article relied on three recent peer-reviewed scientific studies to estimate roughly the 
PDF [probability density function] of S2”). See also Christopher J. Costello et al., Bounded 
Uncertainty and Climate Change Economics, 107 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI 8108, 8109 (2010) 
(noting that if the damage from a given temperature rise is close to the range reported by IPCC, 
then truncating the fat tails of the risk distribution resolves many of the problems Weitzman’s 
Dismal Theorem introduces for cost-benefit analysis, but with the caveat that “if the 
consumption loss caused by warming increases much more rapidly with temperature, this result 
could be overturned”). 
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When responding to critics of cost–benefit analysis more 
generally, some have pointed out that cost–benefit analysis is just one 
tool to inform policymakers.14 They are certainly correct on that 
point, but it is important to account for the impact on the policy 
debate of having one dominant tool that is used for major federal 
rulemaking and that generates a hard, quantitative outcome.15 When 
weighed against the results of any non-mandatory, qualitative 
approach, the effects on the policy development and the surrounding 
debate are predictable. 
Perhaps the best example of the impacts of IAMs on policy 
development is the focus on identifying a range of social costs of 
carbon.16 This leads to policies based on IAMs that largely neglect fat-
tailed risks,17 and the result is a range of social costs of carbon ranging 
in 2010 from roughly five to thirty-five dollars per ton of carbon 
dioxide, with a central point estimate of twenty-one dollars per ton. 
Federal agencies are to use social costs of carbon within this range in 
regulatory decision-making. This range is entirely on-target so long as 
we ignore the principal aspect of climate change that should concern 
us the most: low probability, irreversible, catastrophic outcomes. The 
unsurprising result of an analysis that ignores fat-tailed risks is that a 
low relative priority is given to reducing catastrophic climate risks as 
compared to other societal risks.18 Thus the numbers generated by 
this very precise assessment fail a basic plausibility assessment: they 
are derived from IAMs that largely ignore the precise types of 
 
 14. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 111 (2002) (stating that “[t]he quantitative description should supplement rather 
than displace a qualitative description of relevant effects. . . . Agencies should be permitted to 
make adjustments . . . on the basis of the various ‘qualitative’ factors”). 
 15. Sheila Jasanoff, Acceptable Evidence in a Pluralistic Society, in ACCEPTABLE 
EVIDENCE: SCIENCE AND VALUES IN RISK MANAGEMENT 29, 44 (Deborah G. Mayo & 
Rachelle D. Hollander eds., 1991) (noting that “[r]educing scientific uncertainty to 
mathematical terms offers decision makers a means of rationalizing actions that might otherwise 
seem insupportably arbitrary and subjective. . . . Numerical assessments possess a kind of 
symbolic neutrality that is rarely attained by qualitative formulations”). 
 16. See Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation Standards for Small Electric 
Motors, 75 Fed. Reg. 10,874, 10,909–12 (Mar. 9, 2010); U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, FINAL RULE 
TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT (TSD): ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAM FOR COMMERCIAL 
AND INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT, at app. 15A (2010) (including “Social Cost of Carbon for 
Regulatory Impact Analysis Under Executive Order 12866”), available at 
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/buildings/appliance_standards/commercial/sem_finalrule_tsd.html. 
 17. See Masur & Posner, supra note 7, at 4. 
 18. See Freeman & Guzman, supra note 8, at 1594. See also Ryan Lizza, As the World 
Burns, NEW YORKER, Oct. 11, 2010, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/11/ 
101011fa_fact_lizza. 
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outcomes that should be first on the agenda of a rational risk 
regulator.19 
The assessment of climate change risks also raises a broader issue 
that is fundamental to understanding EPA at forty and to improving 
environmental regulatory activity over the next forty years. In this 
Essay, we argue that, if environmental policymaking is to succeed in 
its second forty years, present concerns about climate risk assessment 
suggest a broader need to improve assessment and decision-making 
regarding what we call macro-risks. Our analysis suggests not only a 
need to focus more on macro-risks, but also a need for the macro-risk 
assessment process to be driven more by the nature of the risk and 
less by the capabilities of traditional risk assessment techniques—
which were honed on micro-risk analysis but face serious 
shortcomings when applied to macro-risks. We suggest that a new 
focus is necessary if rational risk regulation is to occur regarding 
macro-risks, and if cost–benefit analysis is to maintain its hold on 
environmental policymaking across administrations and partisan lines 
as the climate problem becomes more evident. 
We begin by distinguishing macro- and micro-risks and by 
describing why catastrophic climate change represents a largely 
unaccounted-for macro-risk. We believe that climate concerns will 
dominate the risk issues addressed by environmental policymaking 
over the next forty years, and we focus on climate change here, but 
we believe the analysis is relevant to resource allocation across a wide 
range of social risks—including global pandemics, nuclear war, and 
asteroid impacts. We then suggest shifts in methodology and 
institutional arrangements to improve the prospects for rational risk 
regulation regarding macro-risks. No easy remedies exist, but we 
suggest several viable steps to enhance the prospects for rational 
macro-risk regulation. 
 
 19. See Jasanoff, supra note 15, at 44–45 (stating that “quantitative risk assessment is far 
less an independent decision technique than a surrogate for deeper political divergences that 
choose . . . to express themselves as disputes about evidence. . . . The ultimate decision maker 
will still be confronted with the problem of cutting the knot of uncertainty, and it is by no means 
clear that better quantitative characterizations of the range of political choice will enhance the 
legitimacy of the final decision”). 
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II. MACRO-RISKS V. MICRO-RISKS 
A. Micro-Risk Regulation 
Since the founding of EPA, the risk regulation movement has 
made substantial progress regarding rational regulation of micro-
risks. By micro-risks, we mean the type of subject matter that is 
typically addressed by any one rulemaking, even a major rulemaking 
with $100 million or greater economic impact. Rulemakings and other 
policy initiatives addressing micro-risks often address very important 
issues—the health effects of hazardous air pollutants in industrial air 
emissions, maximum contaminant levels in drinking water, effluent 
limitations for pollutant discharges to navigable waters—but failure 
to optimally manage these risks, even failure to address them at all, 
will not result in threats to the social fabric or long-term sustainability 
of the nation or globe. In addition, although uncertainties about costs 
and benefits often exist for micro-risks, micro-risk decisions are not 
dominated by uncertainties about extremely unlikely events. 
In the last three decades, the legal authorities supporting White 
House oversight of the cost–benefit analysis process have become 
increasingly clear.20 In addition, the techniques have become 
increasingly sophisticated for analysis of the costs and benefits of 
regulations addressing micro-risks.21 Although important debates still 
exist about discount rates, the valuation of non-market amenities, the 
role of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, and other 
issues,22 micro-risk analysis has survived and expanded. Over the last 
several decades, cost–benefit analysis has garnered the support of 
many centrist social welfarists,23 and the result has been the 
continuation of its use in White House review of regulations in both 
Republican and Democratic administrations.24 
 
 20. See, e.g., MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2006). 
 21. Id. 
 22. See, e.g., id.; Daniel A. Farber, Rethinking the Role of Cost-benefit Analysis, 76 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1355, 1379–96 (2009). 
 23. See, e.g., RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: 
HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR 
HEALTH (2008); SUNSTEIN, supra note 14; W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK 153–59 (1992) (noting that risk information risk increases 
regulations’ effectiveness); John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, Resolving Risk 
Tradeoffs, in RISK VERSUS RISK 226 (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995). 
 24. Compare Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981) with Exec. Order No. 
12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735. 51,742 § 6(a)(C)(iii) (1993) (requiring that agencies “assess both the 
costs and the benefits of the intended regulation”). For a review of EPA officials’ perspectives 
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Since quantitative White House analysis of the costs and benefits 
of environmental regulations began in the late 1970s, however, 
environmentalists have cast a wary eye on the process. Is it being used 
to improve net social welfare by directing regulatory resources 
toward the most important environmental problems? Or is it simply 
being used to reduce the burden on regulatory targets, even if that 
means a net loss in welfare?25 This is more than a theoretical question. 
Over the long term, the answer will determine whether the large 
number of policymakers and scholars who care about the 
environment but are not environmental advocates support the use of 
cost–benefit analysis. If it is a tool to provide more rational risk 
regulation, it is likely to continue to gather widespread support, and 
kinks or inadequacies can be worked out along the way. If it is simply 
a tool for reducing the costs imposed on regulated industries, then its 
support narrows to a smaller, more ideologically-driven base, and its 
function is much more difficult for non-aligned social welfarists to 
defend. 
B. Macro-Risk Regulation 
We suggest that macro-risks pose a challenge to the continued 
viability of cost-benefit analysis as a central component of rational 
risk regulation. By macro-risks, we mean those risks that have the 
potential to dramatically disrupt the character of markets and 
economies on a global scale and for very long times. Climate change 
is the leading example. Other macro-risks that pose similar problems 
for policymakers include global pandemics, nuclear war, and asteroid 
impacts, and we believe these problems can benefit from the kinds of 
macro-risk analysis that we outline here for climate change.26 Our 
concept of macro-risks is comparable to the term “mega-
catastrophe,” which Kousky and her colleagues characterize as having 
severe impacts covering a large fraction of the planet, irreversibility in 
practical terms on timescales relevant to policymaking, and significant 
 
on White House oversight of EPA regulatory development across administrations, see Lisa 
Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at 
the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47 (2006). 
 25. See, e.g., Press Statement, Office of the President, Statement of the President on the 
Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards (Sept. 2, 2011), available at http:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/02/statement-president-ozone-national-ambient-
air-quality-standards (requesting EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson to withdraw a Clean Air Act 
ozone standard and noting “the importance of reducing regulatory burdens and regulatory 
uncertainty” without discussing the net effects of the proposed ozone standard). 
 26. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 5 (examining potential catastrophic risks). 
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uncertainty not only in the sense of probabilities associated with 
specific hazards, but also in the sense of ignorance of the full list of 
hazards to assess. Because these mega-catastrophes violate the 
conditions for insurance markets to function and because they take 
place on scales of time and space that exceed even governments’ 
ability to spread risk, Kousky and her colleagues conclude that 
“[t]raditional responses to the risk of extreme events are of limited 
value in mitigating risks.”27 Thus, a rational-choice framework for 
managing these risks requires a new approach.28 
Unfortunately, much less progress has been made regarding 
assessment of macro-risks compared to assessment of micro-risks, 
even though the former are inarguably more important than the 
latter. Cost–benefit analysis for risk management generally assumes, 
either implicitly or explicitly, that markets continue to function and to 
equilibrate, so welfare theorems are satisfied.29 Micro-risks can indeed 
be treated as small perturbations to an equilibrium economy: markets 
adjust to the perturbations, a new equilibrium is established, and the 
social welfare at the new perturbed equilibrium can be compared to 
the welfare at the previous unperturbed equilibrium. The disruption 
may increase or decrease the total welfare and may alter its 
distribution, but this leaves the overall economy sufficiently similar to 
its previous state that comparisons are useful and meaningful. 
Moreover, when the second welfare theorem applies, these 
perturbations are reversible: after removing the perturbation—and 
perhaps enacting a one-time transfer of assets—the market can return 
things to the status quo ante. 
Macro-risks are entirely different, and conventional cost–benefit 
analysis breaks down when it attempts to treat them in this manner 
because they may leave the economy so unlike its previous state that 
quantitative comparisons of utility cease to be good descriptors of the 
change. A distinctive characteristic of macro-risks is that the expected 
value of regulation becomes extremely sensitive to which 
mathematical treatment is chosen to represent scientific uncertainty 
 
 27. Carolyn Kousky et al., Responding to Threats of Climate Change Mega-Catastrophes 2–
3 (Harvard Kennedy School Faculty Research Working Paper No. RWP10-008, 2010), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1507992. 
 28. See Weitzman, supra note 12, at 8–14 (noting the limits of traditional cost-benefit 
analysis). 
 29. FRANK ACKERMAN, CAN WE AFFORD THE FUTURE? 8–12 (2009). 
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about extremely unlikely global catastrophes.30 When this uncertainty 
is bounded or modeled with thin tails, the expected utility is 
dominated by reasonably foreseeable micro-risks. Conversely, when 
the uncertainty has fat tails, expected utility is dominated by unlikely 
events that are poorly understood and difficult or impossible to treat 
rigorously. Global climate change is the paradigmatic macro-risk: its 
tail risks threaten not just to perturb markets but to disrupt them 
entirely. The effects of climate change are expected to be irreversible 
for thousands of years; because the magnitude of the damages in the 
tail of the risk distribution are large on the scale of the entire global 
economy and threaten death tolls that are large on the scale of the 
world population, they cannot be treated as small perturbations to a 
system in equilibrium. These large changes violate several 
assumptions of cost–benefit models based on marginal analysis of 
quasi-equilibrium conditions: Costs and benefits may be 
discontinuous and path dependent, so marginal costs and benefits 
may not, in fact, be well-defined but may become infinite and may 
take on multiple values depending on the history that led to them.31 
Rather, since they threaten to disrupt the markets themselves and to 
dramatically change the conditions and constraints of people’s lives 
around the world, we need a very different way to think about them.32 
Moreover, even a very small risk that there are tipping points, 
especially ones that could set off uncontrollable runaway warming, 
poses a great challenge to policies of waiting for greater certainty 
before undertaking expensive precautionary measures. In the words 
of an early and influential assessment of uncertainties about climate 
change, “[a] wait-and-see policy may mean waiting until it is too 
late.”33 
 
 30. See Weitzman, On Modeling and Interpreting, supra note 4. But see Costello et al., 
supra note 13. 
 31. Terry Barker, The Economics of Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change, 89 CLIMATIC 
CHANGE 173, 182–84, 188–89 (2008). 
 32. IPCC PHYSICAL SCIENCE, supra note 6, at 775–77, 822–31 (noting irreversible aspects 
of climate change); Sherwood & Huber, supra note 6, at 9554 (discussing death tolls); 
Weitzman, Stern Review, supra note 4 (noting the scale of economic costs); Weitzman, supra 
note 12, at 2 (noting that standard cost-benefit analysis is not very useful in guiding policy under 
these circumstances). In illustrating the shortcomings of traditional cost-benefit analysis at 
assessing macro-risks, Jaeger et al. point out that the horrors of World War I and World War II 
are not apparent in graphs of gross world product. Carlo Jaeger et al., Stern’s Review and 
Adam’s Fallacy, 89 CLIMATIC CHANGE 207, 208–209 (2008). 
 33. JULE G. CHARNEY ET AL., CARBON DIOXIDE AND CLIMATE: A SCIENTIFIC 
ASSESSMENT, at viii (1979), available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12181. 
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Even strong proponents of cost–benefit analysis acknowledge the 
difficulty of applying it to this sort of macro-risk. Richard Posner 
writes that “global warming seems like the poster child for the 
limitations of cost–benefit analysis.”34 William Nordhaus writes that, 
“[i]f global warming is the mother of all public goods, it may also be 
the father of decision-making under uncertainty,” and in his 
integrated assessment model, “every equation . . . contains major 
unresolved questions.”35 Richard Tol points out that if catastrophic 
climate change produces negative economic growth, this leads to 
mathematical absurdities—infinite variance in the social cost of 
carbon—that can render a cost–benefit analysis meaningless.36 
Nordhaus writes that his integrated assessment model 
“analyz[es] the economics of global warming under the assumption of 
perfect foresight or certainty” while acknowledging that “studies by 
[him] and others provide inconsistent results about the impacts of 
uncertainty.” Yet he concludes that “the certainty-equivalent policy is 
very close to the policy [accounting for] a full range of uncertainty.”37 
This is true for uncertainties in the central part of a normal 
probability distribution, but for extreme risks and fat tails, things may 
break down, and different (and arguably more realistic) choices for 
some of Nordhaus’s parameters lead to very different results, with 
optimal emissions mitigation trajectories that entail rapid emissions 
reduction over a few decades.38 This contrasts with Nordhaus’s results, 
 
 34. POSNER, supra note 5, at 155. 
 35. WILLIAM NORDHAUS, A QUESTION OF BALANCE 62 (2008). 
 36. See Richard S.J. Tol, Is the Uncertainty About Climate Change Too Large for Expected 
Cost-Benefit Analysis?, 56 CLIMATIC CHANGE 265, 277–80 (2003) (noting that if economic 
growth becomes negative, even in some regions of the planet, the IAM results produce infinite 
uncertainty in the social cost of carbon, even for finite damages). See also Richard S.J. Tol & 
Gary W. Yohe, Infinite Uncertainty, Forgotten Feedbacks, and Cost-Benefit Analysis of Climate 
Policy, 83 CLIMATIC CHANGE 429, 440–41 (2007) (noting that adding a second policy lever, 
international development aid, can remedy the infinite uncertainty, but that this lever is not 
robust). 
 37. NORDHAUS, supra note 35, at 63. 
 38. See Frank Ackerman et al., Fat Tails, Exponents, Extreme Uncertainty: Simulating 
Catastrophe in DICE, 69 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 1657, 1660, 1664 (2010) (noting that Nordhaus 
provides “no clear explanation for the crucial assumption that” damages from global warming 
are proportional to the square of the temperature rise, and that if damages are proportional to 
the fourth or fifth power of temperature rise, an optimal policy would lead to complete 
abatement of carbon emissions in 30 to 100 years). See also Elizabeth A. Stanton et al., Inside 
the Integrated Assessment Models: Four Issues in Climate Economics, 1 CLIMATE & 
DEVELOPMENT 166, 172 (2009) (“DICE, like a number of other models, assumes that . . . 
damages are a quadratic function of the temperature change. . . . Our review of the literature 
uncovered no rationale, whether empirical or theoretical, for adopting a quadratic form for the 
damage function. . . . Sensitivity analyses of the Stern Review . . . show that fixing the exponent 
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in which optimum trajectories gradually reduce emissions over the 
course of two centuries.39 
Nordhaus acknowledges Weitzman’s and Tol’s fears about tail 
risks disrupting the entire economy, but he dismisses these concerns 
because his own model does not produce these catastrophic 
outcomes.40 This dismissal is surprising given that Nordhaus 
acknowledges the limits of such models: “We emphasize . . . that 
models such as the present one have limited utility in looking at the 
potential for catastrophic events.”41 Nordhaus goes on to defend the 
use of IAMs despite these shortcomings, writing that “fears about 
low-probability outcomes in the distant future should not impede . . . 
steps to deal with the high probability dangers that are on us today. 
We should start with the clear and present dangers, after which we 
can turn to the unclear and distant threats.”42 
For many micro-risks, this may be a sound approach. However, 
IAMs that do not account fully for the combination of catastrophic 
outcomes and tipping points may affect the sense of urgency and 
priority among the public and policymakers regarding climate 
mitigation. If the IAMs contribute to a go-slow approach, and if our 
inaction over the next several decades allows atmospheric carbon 
concentrations to cross any of several tipping points, the go-slow 
approach may commit us to a trajectory that could lead to 
catastrophe. Certainly if we exclude the possibility of truly 
catastrophic outcomes and tipping points, a go-slow approach is the 
most rational. But, as we note at the outset, climate scientists have 
identified a number of potential tipping points in the climate system 
that could be crossed while the slow policy ramp is implemented, and 
the risk assessment process has not induced the public or 
policymakers to grasp the implicit risks of the go-slow approach or 
the magnitude of the consequences for guessing incorrectly about tail 
risks. The climate science suggests that the possibility of catastrophe 
is quite real, and, to the extent the likelihood can be quantified, it 
exists at levels that none of us would accept for getting on an airplane 
 
at 3—assuming that the damages are a cubic function of the temperature—increases average 
annual damages across the 200 year forecast horizon . . . by a remarkable 23% of world output. 
Thus the equally arbitrary assumption that damages are a cubic, rather than quadratic, function 
of temperature would have a large effect on IAM results, and consequently on their policy 
implications” (citations omitted)). 
 39. See NORDHAUS, supra note 35, 146–47. 
 40. Id. at 146–47. 
 41. Id. at 147. 
 42. Id. 
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or driving a car, much less managing the ability of the planet to 
sustain billions of people for hundreds or thousands of years.43 
Furthermore, concerns about severe climate harms are not just 
the pipe dreams of catastrophists.44 We discuss here just three of the 
numerous examples of plausible catastrophic outcomes that do not 
appear to be accounted for in the leading IAMs. Additional examples 
can be found in a number of the most highly regarded, peer-reviewed 
scientific journals and books.45 
Extreme Heat Waves. Our first example was identified in a recent 
paper published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences by Sherwood and Huber. The paper examines the effects of 
climate change 300 years from now, asking what regions on earth 
would be too hot and humid for humans to survive outdoors even 
under optimal conditions— that is, naked, soaking wet, and with high 
winds to cool them.46 The implications of the paper are stark and are 
hard to square with an analysis whose high-end damages are roughly 
ten percent of gross domestic product (GDP). For seven degrees 
Celsius of average warming, some currently inhabited regions of the 
planet would experience sporadic heat waves that would kill anyone 
caught outside or without access to air conditioning within hours. For 
eleven to twelve degrees Celsius average warming, these kill zones 
would expand to include most places currently inhabited by people. 
These heat waves would not come every year, but when they did, life 
would be possible in those places only by remaining indoors with air 
conditioning at all times. 
What is the probability that the planet will heat up eleven 
degrees or more? If we continue along the higher end of plausible 
business-as-usual emissions paths, atmospheric CO2 could reach four 
times its preindustrial level over the next century or so. Several recent 
 
 43. See, e.g., Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Climate Change, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 2, 5 
tbl.1 (2008) (providing table with likelihoods of temperature increases over two degrees C 
above pre-industrial levels). 
 44. For a discussion of how the likelihood of a climate catastrophe has affected a leading 
climate scientist, see Elizabeth Kolbert, The Catastrophist, NEW YORKER, June 29, 2009, at 39. 
 45.  See, e.g., AVOIDING DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE (Hans J. Schellnhuber et al. eds., 
2006); V. Ramanathan, On Avoiding Dangerous Anthropogenic Interference with the Climate 
System: Formidable Challenges Ahead, 105 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 14245 (2008); Joel B. Smith 
et al., Assessing Dangerous Climate Change Through an Update of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) “Reasons for Concern,” 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 4133 (2009). 
 46. Sherwood & Huber, supra note 6, at 9552 (concluding that “recent estimates of the 
costs of unmitigated climate change are too low unless the range of possible warming can 
somehow be narrowed”). 
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analyses estimate that there is at least a five percent probability that 
the climate sensitivity is greater than six degrees Celsius.47 If that is 
correct, quadrupling CO2 could raise temperatures by more than 
twelve degrees Celsius. Even if we take these model results with a 
grain of salt, supposing that there’s a ninety-five percent chance they 
are grossly wrong about the probability of a six degree climate 
sensitivity or the consequences of eleven degree warming, that leaves 
more than a one-in-four-hundred probability—five percent chance 
that the papers are right times a five percent chance that the 
sensitivity is greater than 6 degrees—that most currently inhabited 
areas will experience occasional heat waves deadlier than anything in 
recorded history. If these heat waves occur on average once every ten 
years in any region, the average annual death toll among the world’s 
poor would be hundreds of millions.48 
Global Food Shortages. Another macro-risk associated with 
climate change is the breakdown of the world’s food supply. If 
drought, extreme heat, or severe weather causes a catastrophic loss of 
a single nation’s agricultural output for a year or two, global trade can 
respond to supply food to the stricken nation. Moreover, in a world of 
plenty where surpluses are taken for granted, food is cheap and 
agriculture is a small part of the GDP of developed nations, so the 
potential impacts of climate change on food production seem very 
small using today’s marginal elasticities. If climate change produces a 
chain of crop failures across many nations, however, the disruptions—
whether we measure them in dollars or lives lost—could well be far 
 
 47. Malte Meinshausen et al., Greenhouse-Gas Emission Targets for Limiting Global 
Warming to 2°C, 458 NATURE 1158, 1158 (2009) (estimating a 5% probability of a sensitivity 
greater than 7°C); N.G. Andronova & M.E. Schlessinger, Objective Estimation of the Probability 
Density Function for Climate Sensitivity, 106 J. GEOPHYS. RES. ATMOSPHERES 22,605, 22,605 
(2001); Reto Knutti et al., Constraints on Radiative Forcing and Future Climate Change from 
Observations and Climate Model Ensembles, 416 NATURE 719, 719 (2002); J.M. Gregory et al., 
An Observationally Based Estimate of the Climate Sensitivity, 15 J. CLIMATE 3117, 3117 (2002); 
G.H. Roe & M.B. Baker, Why is Climate so Unpredictable, 318 SCIENCE 629, 630 fig.2 (2007). 
But see J.D. Annan & J.C. Hargreaves, Using Multiple Observationally-Based Constraints to 
Estimate Climate Sensitivity, 33 GEOPHYS. RES. LETT. L06704, L06704 (2006) (assigning a 5% 
probability that climate sensitivity exceeds 4.5°C, with negligible probability that it exceeds 
6°C). 
 48. In the absence of the development and global deployment of some remarkable new 
energy technology, attempting to remedy this by providing air conditioning to everyone on 
earth would create a deadly race as a burgeoning coal-powered electrical generation 
infrastructure hastens the arrival of the heat waves against which it is intended to protect. 
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greater than would be predicted by multiplying crop losses by current 
market prices.49 
Quantitatively assessing the probability and magnitude of 
widespread crop failures around the planet is not possible with any 
degree of certainty. Rising temperatures have both beneficial and 
harmful effects on crop yields. Carbon dioxide fertilization may or 
may not offset a large part of the anticipated heat and water stress. 
Farmers can adapt to changing climate, both by changing planting 
times and crop choices and also by adopting more expensive 
technology in the fields. The interactions of all these factors produces 
great uncertainty and estimates of the impact of climate change on 
global food production reported in one recent review range from a 
one percent gain to a twenty percent loss.50 These estimates 
understate the fat tail on the high-risk side of the distribution, 
however, because they do not account for higher-than-expected 
climate sensitivity; extreme weather events, including heat waves, 
heavy precipitation, severe storms, and so on; indirect effects of 
climate change on air quality, pests, and disease; sea-level rise,  which 
would particularly affect rice production; and reductions in grain 
quality. 
To understand the potential vulnerability in the agricultural 
sector, consider the so-called Medieval Warm Period, between about 
900 and 1400 C.E. Temperatures in what is now the contiguous 
United States were slightly warmer than today, and the region 
suffered a sequence of mega-droughts of much greater severity than 
the Dust Bowl drought of the 1930s, which lasted between 40 and 240 
years.51 Solomon and her colleagues report good agreement among 
different climate models that recurring droughts of similar or greater 
severity—up to three times as severe as the Dust Bowl—are expected 
in many parts of the world if greenhouse gas emissions are not sharply 
curtailed, and these patterns of recurring droughts would be 
irreversible for thousands of years.52 Even with all the improvements 
to agriculture that modern technology has provided, such droughts 
 
 49. Kousky et al., supra note 27, at 6–7 (describing the way multiple local disasters could 
cascade to rapidly create a global mega-catastrophe). 
 50. David B. Lobell, Global Crop Production and Food Security, in CLIMATE CHANGE 
SCIENCE AND POLICY 113, 115 (Stephen H. Schneider et al. eds., 2010). 
 51. See Edward Cook et al., Megadroughts in North America: Placing IPCC Projections of 
Hydroclimatic Change in a Long-Term Paleoclimate Context, 25 J. QUATERNARY SCI. 48, 55, 
57–59 (2010). 
 52. Susan Solomon et al., Irreversible Climate Change Due to Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 
106 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 1704, 1706–07 (2009). 
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would be devastating, and recent research comparing past climates to 
model calculations adds strength to the predictions that global 
warming could very well produce similar droughts.53 In many 
countries, including the U.S., India, and China, major aquifers are 
being rapidly depleted, so coping with drought by irrigating with 
groundwater will become increasingly difficult.54 
As population growth stresses the ability of many Asian nations, 
such as India, China, and Bangladesh, to feed their people, trade is 
accelerating with African nations for food and other agricultural 
products, such as biofuels and raw materials for industry.55 Several 
strategically important oil states are also looking to sub-Saharan 
Africa as major food suppliers. Acquisitions of farmland by outsiders 
can exacerbate political instability.56 As complex interactions between 
agriculture, economic development, trade, shifting alliances, and the 
internal political dynamics of vulnerable nations respond to stresses 
from climate change, the repercussions are unpredictable and 
potentially global. Robert D. Kaplan has argued that climatic stress 
has the potential to act as a tipping point in countries, such as 
Bangladesh, that are currently peaceful, but could both tip into 
internal violence and spark broader regional or global conflict.57 
Ocean Acidification. A third type of macro-risk is ocean 
acidification. Quite separately from its climatic effects as a 
 
 53. Cook et al., supra note 51, at 58–59; Peter J. Fawcett et al., Extended Megadroughts in 
the Southwestern United States During Pleistocene Interglacials, 470 NATURE 518, 520 (2011). It 
is not possible to predict mega-droughts with confidence, but recent research confirms that such 
mega-droughts did take place during the warmest parts of the interglacial periods of the last 
half-million years, as computer model calculations had indicated. This agreement between 
theory and observation adds credibility to those same models’ predictions that such droughts 
are a likely consequence of anthropogenic global warming. 
 54. SANDRA POSTEL, PILLAR OF SAND: CAN THE IRRIGATION MIRACLE LAST 6 (1999). 
 55. See, e.g., Scott Baldauf, Hunger and Food Security: Is Africa Selling the Farm?, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 6, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-Issues/ 
2011/0206/Hunger-and-food-security-Is-Africa-selling-the-farm. 
 56. Id. Crop failures in Africa could intensify local conflicts between exporting food and 
consuming it domestically and also create international conflicts as importing nations treat 
failure to honor export agreements as threats to their national security. See Kousky et al., supra 
note 27, at 7. See also David D. Zhang et al., Global Climate Change, War, and Population 
Decline in Recent Human History, 104 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 19214 (2007) (describing 
connections between natural climatic change, crop failures, civic disruption, and war during the 
Little Ice Age of the 15th to 19th centuries). 
 57. ROBERT D. KAPLAN, MONSOON, at xiv, 134–53 (2010) (concluding that “[t]he monsoon 
is nature writ large, a spectacle of turbulence that suggests the effect of the environment on 
humankind living in increasingly crowded and fragile conditions . . . . America’s ability to grasp 
what . . . the monsoon represents . . . will help determine America’s own destiny and that of the 
West as a whole”). 
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greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide also has a significant effect on the 
acidity of the worlds’ oceans. Roughly one third of the carbon dioxide 
emitted into the atmosphere dissolves into the oceans, where it reacts 
with water to form carbonic acid.58 Whereas the details of climatic 
change are so complicated that they challenge even the most powerful 
computers, ocean acidification results from very simple and 
straightforward chemistry—although the biological response of 
ecosystems is still rather uncertain.59 This acidification is likely to 
reduce the natural alkalinity of sea water to the point where the 
carbonate shells and exoskeletons of corals, shellfish, plankton, 
urchins, and so on start to dissolve.60 Disrupting the lowest trophic 
levels of ocean ecosystems, such as corals and plankton, can have 
dramatic and catastrophic effects on economically valuable 
populations of ocean life: the fossil record shows mass extinctions of 
sea life that coincide with ocean acidification, but there are too many 
complicating factors to make clear causal connections.61 It is clear that 
corals and other calcifying species can gradually evolve to survive in 
conditions at least as acidic as anthropogenic carbon emissions are 
likely to produce, but this evolution takes millions of years and rapid 
changes in ocean acidity can drive calcifying organisms to extinction. 
Finally, the interactions between ocean acidification and other 
anthropogenic stresses are poorly understood and may dramatically 
amplify the risks.62 
Although we cannot make certain predictions of the ecological 
impacts of CO2 emissions due to ocean acidification, there is a real 
prospect of mass extinctions that could cascade through the marine 
food web and devastate fisheries, which provide as much as twenty 
 
 58. Ocean water is technically slightly alkaline. The acidification due to CO2 emissions is 
not expected to turn the water acidic, but because it reduces the alkalinity and brings the water 
closer to an acidic state, it is called acidification. See, e.g., Scott C. Doney et al., Ocean 
Acidification: The Other CO2 Problem, 1 ANN. REV. MARINE SCI. 169, 170 (2009). 
 59. See, e.g., Quirin Schiermeier, Earth’s Acid Test, 471 NATURE 154 (2011). 
 60. Doney et al., supra note 58, at 174–78; J.A. KLEYPAS ET AL., IMPACTS OF OCEAN 
ACIDIFICATION ON CORAL REEFS AND OTHER MARINE CALCIFIERS: A GUIDE FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH (2006), available at http://www.isse.ucar.edu/florida/report/ 
Ocean_acidification_res_guide_compressed.pdf. 
 61. Doney et al., supra note 58, at 183–84; Ken Caldeira, What Corals Are Dying to Tell Us 
About CO2 and Ocean Acidification, OCEANOGRAPHY, June 2007, at 188, 188–89; J.E.N. Veron, 
Mass Extinctions and Ocean Acidification: Biological Constraints on Geological Dilemmas, 27 
CORAL REEFS 459, 469 (2008). 
 62. See generally Philip W. Boyd, Beyond Ocean Acidification, 4 NATURE GEOSCI. 273 
(2011). 
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percent of the protein consumed by people worldwide.63 Beyond their 
contribution to food supplies, fisheries provide jobs and economic 
activity that are crucial to poor nations, so losing fisheries would add 
to economic and political stress arising from climate change. If 
combined with a collapse of cereal production, as described above, 
this loss of fisheries could produce a globally catastrophic famine.64 
III. A NEW FOCUS ON MACRO-RISKS 
How can the risk regulation system be adapted to account for 
macro-risks? Rational regulation of macro-risks requires identifying, 
assessing, comparing, and communicating information about macro-
risks in ways that enable the public and policymakers to engage in 
informed, unbiased decision-making about the preferred level and 
timing of social investment in risk reduction. Although the same 
could be said for micro-risks, the differences between micro- and 
macro-risks suggest that different approaches often will be necessary. 
We do not offer comprehensive reforms, but we suggest several steps 
to improve risk assessment and risk management for climate macro-
risks. 
A. Macro-Risk Assessment 
From our perspective, two options are preferable to risk 
assessment approaches that essentially exclude low probability but 
catastrophic outcomes: (1) development of modified models that 
account for uncertainties about these catastrophic outcomes; or (2) an 
expert elicitation to generate subjective judgments that account for 
these outcomes. Regardless of the approach taken, we suggest 
subjecting the assumptions and outputs of the selected approach to 
plausibility assessments by experts in the relevant underlying 
disciplines and communicating the outputs of the process in ways that 
account for the likely impacts of information on the policy debate. 
 
 63. Doney et al., supra note 58, at 179–80, 184; Sarah R. Cooley & Scott C. Doney, 
Anticipating Ocean Acidification’s Economic Consequences for Commercial Fisheries, 4 ENVTL. 
RES. LETTERS 024007, at 6–7 (2009); R.I. Perry, Potential Impacts of Climate Change on Marine 
Wild Capture Fisheries: An Update, 149 J. AGRIC. SCI. 63, 69–70 (2011). 
 64. Summarizing the prospects for global fisheries, Jeremy Jackson writes, “In light of 
everything we know about upheavals in the geological past, another great mass extinction 
appears inevitable,” adding that “the question is not whether these trends will happen, but how 
fast they will happen, and what will be the consequences for the oceans and humanity.” Jeremy 
B.C. Jackson, The Future of Oceans Past, 365 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B 3765, 3772 
(2010). 
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Models that Account for Tail Risks. In developing risk assessment 
methods that are appropriate for macro-risks, risk analysts should 
avoid the tendency to assume that every problem examined by cost–
benefit analysis is a traditional market failure best addressed by 
tweaks to the market system.65 As we discuss above, classical 
economics typically deals with externalities as a perturbation on a 
fundamentally stable and efficient free market. The public 
intervention to address these externalities typically involves making 
small corrections to a largely laissez faire system, either by assigning 
property rights, pricing the externality, or directly regulating 
behavior. With climate change, the externalities become as large as 
the market system, and this calls for a different paradigm.66 This 
heuristic inference receives rigorous quantitative support from 
Weitzman’s Dismal Theorem.67 Although it may be difficult to modify 
traditional cost–benefit methods to account for fat tails, a new 
generation of research is exploring the consequences of adding 
explicit treatment of extreme risks in the tails of the distribution.68 
One response to the concern about the limitations of IAMs is 
that cost–benefit analysis is only one of many ways to provide input 
into the decision-making process, and if this one does not account for 
 
 65. We should not expect rational risk assessment necessarily to translate to low-cost, 
moderate-cost, or high-cost risk regulation. If the risk assessment analysis suggests that no 
regulation is necessary, then that outcome needs to be reported and given serious weight. 
Similarly, if it suggests that major regulatory activity is necessary, even if costly or unpopular, 
then that outcome, too, requires airing and serious consideration. See Kousky et al., supra note 
27, at 25–27 (commenting on the need for “better understanding of the behavioral and 
institutional constraints that must lie behind our failure to pursue seemingly obvious self-
interested actions”). If, instead, it simply suggests that a moderate approach be taken regardless 
of the issue, it is not necessarily rational. See Masur & Posner, supra note 7, at 25 (noting that 
the OMB Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Carbon did just this, when it 
“adopted ‘political’ solutions, designed to appease all sides, where more difficult technical 
decisions were called for”). It is just moderate, which will in some cases be rational and in others 
not. 
 66. See, e.g., Jaeger et al., supra note 32; ACKERMAN, supra note 29, at 160; ULRICH BECK, 
RISK SOCIETY: TOWARD A NEW MODERNITY 19–20 (1992) (noting that the economic paradigm 
in which conflict arises dominantly over distribution of scarce goods, which can largely be 
treated as economic internalities, is being joined if not replaced by a new paradigm that focuses 
on conflict over distributing abundant bads, which are largely externalities). 
 67. See Weitzman, On Modeling and Interpreting, supra note 4, at 18. 
 68. See, e.g., Ackerman et al., supra note 38; Michael D. Gerst et al., Accounting for the 
Risk of Extreme Outcomes in an Integrated Assessment of Climate Change, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 
4540 (2010); Derek M. Lemoine & Christian Traeger, Tipping Points and Ambiguity in the 
Integrated Assessment of Climate Change (Univ. Cal. Berkeley Dep’t Agric. & Resource Econ. 
& Policy CUDARE Working Paper No. 1111, 2010), available at http://escholarship.org/ 
uc/item/9nd591ww. 
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plausible catastrophic outcomes, the answer is to simply add other 
analyses to the policy mix. But the current policymaking process does 
not work this way. Cost–benefit analysis, not any other form of 
analysis, is required under the relevant executive orders. In theory, 
non-quantified, “soft” assessments can be considered alongside the 
quantitative outcomes of cost-benefit analysis,69 but quantitative 
outcomes can be expected to dominate non-quantitative outcomes in 
policy debates.70 
Expert Elicitation. The use of expert elicitation is a substantial 
departure from the dominant approach to micro-risks, but it may 
generate a more rational regulatory response for climate change than 
a more traditional quantitative approach that does not account for 
fat-tailed uncertainty.71 As the debate between Weitzman and his 
critics over the proper interpretation of the Dismal Theorem 
underscores, a quantitative analysis of fat-tailed climate risks and 
policies to address them depends crucially on the value society places 
on its continued existence and on the mathematical representation of 
the extreme uncertainty regarding threats to its continued existence. 
Is the correct net present value for preventing a permanent collapse 
simply a multiple of the value of a statistical life, or is the value of 
civilization vastly greater than the sum of its parts? Given the scope 
both of the risks and of the remedies—mitigation, adaptation, and 
geoengineering—that are proposed, it is essential to address squarely 
the question of what value to place on the future of civilization. Such 
discussion need not focus specifically on the end of civilization, for 
the Dismal Theorem implies generally that for any improbable 
catastrophe that threatens to significantly disrupt society, fat tailed 
uncertainty can cause it to dominate a cost–benefit calculation, 
depending on the relationship between the cost of the disruption and 
the shape of the tails in the probability distribution. In the face of 
 
 69. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,735 § 1(a); SUNSTEIN, supra note 14, 
at 111. 
 70. See, e.g., Editorial, National Mission, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/21/opinion/21mon1.html (noting $150 per year cost to 
American households of proposed climate legislation but expressing benefits in qualitative 
terms). 
 71. Michael Oppenheimer et al., The Limits of Consensus, 317 SCIENCE 1505, 1505 (2007) 
(suggesting that “alternatives to model-based approaches, such as . . . expert elicitation, . . . 
certainly would have been useful to policy-makers”). On the use of expert elicitation in 
environmental rulemaking, see, for example, SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH 116–18 
(1990) (describing controversies over the EPA’s use of expert elicitation in its 1986 revision of 
ambient ozone standards), and Sheila Jasanoff, supra note 15, at 36–37 (extending this 
discussion to lead and sulfur emissions). 
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these types of concerns, a qualitative expert elicitation may lead to a 
more rational regulatory response than a quantitative analysis that is 
opaque to most policymakers and the public. 
The complexity of cost–benefit analysis also can mask other 
important value judgments that are particularly important for macro-
risks but are embedded in choices about discount rates and other 
issues that are largely inaccessible to the public. Even economists 
cannot provide a completely coherent or consistent account of inter-
temporal discounting for macro-risks. In the debate between Stern 
and Nordhaus over the ethical foundations of discount rates, each is 
able to demonstrate significant inconsistencies in the other’s 
treatment of the marginal elasticity of consumption, with the result 
that each economist’s choice of discount rate reflects tacit ethical 
preferences, and data from actual markets are sufficiently inconsistent 
that the dispute cannot be resolved empirically.72 When the issue 
being analyzed is a micro-risk problem, this lack of accessibility is 
probably a cost worth bearing, given the analytical rigor added to the 
regulatory process. When the issue being analyzed is a macro-risk 
such as catastrophic climate change, the choice may affect massive 
allocations of resources within the current generation and among the 
current generation and tens or hundreds of future generations. This 
level of opacity may be acceptable for micro-risks, but it is unlikely to 
yield rational regulatory responses to macro-risks.73 
 
 72.  William Nordhaus, Critical Assumptions in the Stern Review on Climate Change, 317 
SCIENCE 201, 202 (2007); Nicholas Stern & Chris Taylor, Climate Change: Risk, Ethics, and the 
Stern Review, 317 SCIENCE 203 (2007). Nordhaus points out that Stern’s choice for the elasticity 
of the marginal utility of consumption implies taking from the poor in this generation to give to 
the rich in future generations while Stern points out that Nordhaus’s preferred value would 
imply support for a policy that heavily taxed the rich today, transferred 1 percent of the 
proceeds to the poor, and lost or destroyed the other 99 percent. Since both of these 
hypothetical programs are prima facie absurd, it is clear that the Ramsey approach to 
discounting breaks down for the large time spans involved in macro risks. See also John 
Quiggin, Stern and His Critics on Discounting and Climate Change: An Editorial Essay, 89 
CLIMATIC CHANGE 195, 198–202 (2008) (demonstrating the connection between disagreements 
between Stern and his critics and the widely recognized “equity premium puzzle” of economics 
and also observing that actual market pricing of low-risk bonds imply low intertemporal 
discounting rates consistent with Stern’s values for pure time preference and elasticity of the 
marginal utility of consumption). 
 73. For a review of concerns about the application of standard cost-benefit analysis 
techniques to climate change, see Masur & Posner, supra note 7. Ackerman and DeCanio have 
observed that mainstream integrated assessment models make assumptions about probability 
distributions and economic efficiency that do not reflect the best scientific and empirical 
knowledge of the climate system or the state of the economy, and that these assumptions tacitly 
bias the models against taking strong action to mitigate climate change. STEPHEN J. DECANIO, 
ECONOMIC MODELS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: A CRITIQUE 157 (2003); Ackerman et al., supra 
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Interdisciplinary Plausibility Assessment. Regardless of the 
method chosen, it is important to subject climate and other macro-
risk assessments to plausibility assessments by experts in the fields 
underlying the economic analysis.74 For example, climate scientists are 
better situated than economists to understand the state of the physical 
world if temperatures are four degrees Celsius higher. They should be 
asked to judge the plausibility of economic models’ assessments of the 
economic impacts that will occur at those temperatures. Is it possible 
that GDP will only be reduced by one to five percent in a world 
marked by a four degree Celsius rise, as the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) and the DICE model suggest?75 It is, but 
recent analyses of what conditions will prevail under a four degree 
Celsius temperature regime suggest that the economic costs of 
adaptation to or enduring such climate change are much more 
uncertain and depend much more critically on social and 
psychological factors than adaptation to or enduring two degree 
Celsius warming.76 Thus, there is a distinct possibility that the IPCC 
and the DICE model far underestimate the damage from or cost of 
adapting to four degree Celsius warming, and this discrepancy could 
grow quickly for warming beyond four degrees Celsius. An 
interdisciplinary plausibility analysis would be expensive and time-
consuming, and it is not necessary for run-of-the-mill cost–benefit 
 
note 38, at 1657. DeCanio comments that integrated economic–environmental models have very 
poor accuracy at predicting energy demand even a decade or two in the future, in part because 
the models incorrectly assume that firms operate at maximum efficiency and also because the 
dynamics of technological innovation are too poorly understood to be modeled effectively. 
These flaws lead the vast majority of models to grossly overestimate the growth of energy 
demand and thus to overstate the cost of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Despite these 
known weaknesses, quantitative models tend to dominate policy discussions in part because 
their results generate simple, quantitative outcomes that can be widely applied across many 
regulatory settings, whereas qualitative analyses are difficult to express and to apply widely. 
 74. Kousky et al., supra note 27, at 23–27 (calling for a balanced portfolio of 
geoengineering, adaptation, and aggressive mitigation; and making decisions based on a 
structured consideration of the entire range of expert judgment). 
 75. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: 
IMPACTS, ADAPTATIONS, AND VULNERABILITY 17 (Martin L. Parry et al. eds., 2007), available 
at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-spm.pdf; NORDHAUS, supra note 
35, at 51. 
 76. See Mark New et al., Four Degrees and Beyond: The Potential for a Global Temperature 
Increase of Four Degrees and Its Implications, 369 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 6 
(2011); Mark S. Smith et al., Rethinking Adaptation to a 4°C World, 369 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS 
ROYAL SOC’Y A 196 (2011). For a discussion of the implications of a four degree C warming, 
see New, supra, and the articles that follow, all of which are available at http:// 
rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/369/1934.toc (dedicated issue addressing implications of 
global average temperature increase of four degrees C and higher). 
Vandenbergh_122211 (Do Not Delete) 12/22/2011  1:41 PM 
424 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 21:401 
analyses of micro-risk issues, but it is necessary when the assessment 
concerns the type of macro-risk issues that have been insufficiently 
addressed by the risk regulation process to date. 
Communication of Macro-Risk Assessment Information. 
Regardless of the risk assessment methods used, risk assessment 
results for macro-risks should be communicated in ways that reflect 
how information influences policymakers and the public. Unlike 
micro-risks, where the issues will often not rise to the level of non-
expert concern, macro-risks by their very nature will more often be 
the subject of active public debate and deliberation by policymakers 
at the highest levels. Few in the general public likely understand that 
the social costs of carbon—or more generally experts’ comfort with 
go-slow approaches—are based on models that exclude tail risks and 
tipping points, and include discount rates that value continued human 
existence in several hundred years at next to nothing. Perhaps 
knowing this information would not change near-term risk response 
preferences, but not knowing this information certainly can be 
expected to make an aggressive response less likely. 
The limited treatment of catastrophic harms in IAMs is not the 
only example of climate risk assessment and risk communication that 
is unlikely to yield rational risk regulation. One response to the 
challenges posed by calculating costs and benefits of climate change is 
to avoid the need for a cost–benefit analysis by simply selecting a 
climate change goal and performing a cost effectiveness analysis.77 
This would simplify the analysis and would avoid the fat tail problem. 
The shortcoming of this approach, however, is that it does not 
provide guidance on what the climate change goal should be, and it 
focuses the public debate on quantitative estimates of the costs of 
climate mitigation without comparable estimates of the benefits of 
reducing climate harms. A recent example of this phenomenon is the 
request by Congress for EPA to prepare a cost-effectiveness analysis 
of the Waxman-Markey climate change bill in the House of 
Representatives.78 The cost effectiveness analysis provided fodder for 
critics of the near-term pecuniary costs of the bill without providing 
 
 77. See, e.g., Richard D. Morgenstern, Critiquing the Critique of the Climate Change Winner 
Argument, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,720, 10,720–22 (2011) (arguing that a cost-effectiveness 
analysis, not a cost-benefit analysis, is appropriate for evaluating climate change policy). 
 78. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY 
AND SECURITY ACT OF 2009, H.R. 2454 IN THE 111TH CONGRESS 1 (2009), available at http:// 
www.epa.gov/climatechange/economics/pdfs/HR2454_Analysis.pdf. 
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comparable information about the benefits,79 and much of the debate 
revolved around the near-term costs, not the underlying reasons for 
bearing those costs.80 
Another example of the importance of accounting for public 
debates in the communication of climate risk assessment issues is the 
treatment of sea level increases in the IPCC 2007 report to 
policymakers. The quantitative result in the report for the decade 
between 2090 and 2099 was thirty-five centimeters, or about fourteen 
inches, as the central estimate, with fifty-nine centimeters, roughly 
two feet, in the worst case. The text noted, albeit rather cryptically for 
non-experts, that this figure excluded contributions from break-up of 
the Antarctic and Greenland ice sheets since ice sheet break-up could 
not be modeled reliably.81 
This approach may have been true to the best risk assessment 
methodology, but it was a risk management mistake.82 A full 
understanding of the likely 2100 sea level increase required reading 
not only the quantitative figures on page thirteen, but also the 
qualitative warning on pages fourteen and seventeen. Skeptics used 
the fifty-nine centimeter figure to discredit policy advocates who had 
been warning about sea level increases of a meter or more. The 
skeptics argued that those policy advocates were alarmists, and that 
the IPCC estimate for sea level increases went down, not up, from the 
2001 IPCC report—known as AR3—to the 2007 IPCC report—
known as FAR. This left non-skeptics scrambling to note the 
qualifying language and unable to attach a quantitative figure to it. 
 
 79. The EPA analysis covers costs due to higher energy prices, price changes for other 
goods and services, impacts on wages and returns on capital. Id. at 4. It does not account for the 
benefits of avoiding the effects of climate change. Id. 
 80. See, e.g., DAVID KREUTZER, HERITAGE FOUND., HERITAGE ANALYSIS OF WAXMAN-
MARKEY HITS WHERE OTHERS MISS (2009), available at http://www.heritage.org/ 
research/reports/2009/08/heritage-analysis-of-waxman-markey-hits-where-others-miss (faulting 
EPA for underestimating the costs by making unrealistic assumptions); LAURIER T. JOHNSON, 
NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION’S WAXMAN-MARKEY 
ANALYSIS, available at http://docs.nrdc.org/globalwarming/files/glo_10042201a.pdf (criticizing 
the Heritage Foundation’s cost analysis for making unrealistic assumptions). 
 81. See IPCC PHYSICAL SCIENCE, supra note 6, at 13–17. 
 82. Oppenheimer, supra note 71, at 1505 (noting that “[t]he emphasis on consensus in 
IPCC reports . . . has put the spotlight on expected outcomes. . . . [I]t is now equally important 
that policy-makers understand the more extreme possibilities that consensus may exclude or 
downplay”).  For a discussion of how potential catastrophic events should be discussed in the 
next IPCC report, see Socolow, supra note 5, at 3 (noting that the next report of the IPCC 
should communicate fully about the state of scientific understanding regarding catastrophic 
outcomes). 
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Although the IPCC report to policymakers may have taken the 
appropriate risk assessment approach, the report, as its name 
suggests, is designed to enhance rational risk management by 
informing policymakers and the public. It is entirely predictable that 
placing a low quantitative estimate in one place and very important 
qualifying information elsewhere, in a document explicitly written for 
policymakers and in a policy environment in which skeptics are more 
than willing to cherry-pick the results, will not generate a complete 
policy debate. More recently, Rahmstorf summarized semi-empirical 
studies of sea-level rise, which demonstrate the shortcomings of the 
IPCC approach: “Since the beginning of satellite measurements, sea 
level has risen 80 percent faster . . . than the average IPCC model 
projection.”83 Rahmstorf concludes that the most probable value for 
sea-level rise by 2095 would be 114 centimeters: seventy-nine 
centimeters greater than the IPCC’s central estimate and almost twice 
the IPCC’s worst-case value.84 The worst-case reported by Rahmstorf 
was close to 200 centimeters, and Rahmstorf emphasized that even 
this was likely an underestimate because the semi-empirical models 
neglected the possibility of nonlinear acceleration of ice-flow.85 
B. Macro-Risk Management Institutional Arrangements 
As difficult as macro-risk assessment may be, macro-risk 
management is even more difficult. For catastrophic climate change, 
the uncertainty about outcomes and tipping points, the mismatch 
between near-term costs and long-term benefits, and the uneven 
distribution of costs and benefits among countries and economic 
sectors all complicate risk management. We do not offer a complete 
solution, but we suggest two measures that will enhance the prospects 
that the right people have the necessary information to act. 
Identify and Inform the True Gatekeepers. Even the most 
accurate and complete macro-risk assessment methods will not lead 
to rational risk regulation if they do not affect the actual decision-
makers. To be successful, rational risk regulation for macro-risks 
must affect the top decision-makers who not only have the authority 
to make decisions at this level, but also to influence public opinion. 
We have prepared this Essay for a conference about EPA, and EPA 
 
 83. Stefan Rahmstorf, A New View on Sea-Level Rise, 4 NATURE REP. CLIMATE CHANGE 
44, 44 (2010). 
 84. Id. at 45. 
 85. Id. at 44–45. 
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and the other federal environmental agencies—Interior, NOAA, 
Agriculture, and Energy, for example—tend to get the blame when 
policy fails to match expert perceptions of risk, but, in the final 
analysis, macro-risk decisions are not made by EPA or the other 
agencies. The EPA administrator and other agency heads have an 
effect on macro-risk decisions, but the scale of the resource 
allocations, the tremendous political costs of informing the public 
about risks that it does not want to hear about, and the cost of 
building public support for rational responses to those risks occurs at 
the White House and at the highest levels of Congress, if it occurs at 
all. Pounding on EPA to do a better job of matching expert and 
public perceptions of risk, given the regulatory and resource controls 
imposed on the Agency by the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB), other White House offices, and Congress, reflects a 
misperception of the locus of decision-making on climate and other 
macro-risks. 
Instead, decisions regarding macro-risk are ultimately made by 
the president and top congressional leaders with the advice of a very 
close circle of advisors.86 Decision-making often does not occur even 
among the usual suspects at the White House—the environmental 
experts, whether at the Council on Environmental Quality, OIRA, or 
other offices established by presidents to address these issues—but 
rather by the very top political and economic advisors.87 Given the 
near-term costs and long-term benefits of carbon mitigation, it is not 
surprising that generalist advisors in Republican and Democratic 
administrations have given policy preference to other more 
immediate and more politically salient, but ultimately less important, 
issues than climate change. A similar phenomenon has occurred at 
the very top levels of Congress.88 
From our perspective, rational regulation of macro-risks will only 
occur when the generalist advisors closest to the President and the 
top leaders of Congress understand the nature of the leading 
environmental risks and are induced to recommend adequate 
allocations of political capital to address them. That is a tall task, but 
we believe it is a mistake to frame the challenge in any other way. An 
important starting point is for scholars and policy analysts to focus on 
 
 86.  See Lizza, supra note 18. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Although the U.S. House of Representatives passed a cap-and-trade bill in 2009, the 
Senate never brought a bill to the floor. See id. 
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how these generalist advisors can be induced to confront information 
about macro-risks, even if these risks pose a political challenge.89 
Generate Periodic Macro-Risk Reports. New institutional 
mechanisms can be adopted to increase the likelihood that the core 
group of influential policymakers confront the hard choices presented 
by macro-risks. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, movement in this 
direction seemed imminent. Two EPA reports attempted to assess 
risks and to induce the White House and Congress to re-allocate 
resources to the highest risks.90 
In the Unfinished Business report, prepared at the request of 
EPA Administrator Lee Thomas during the second Reagan 
Administration, senior EPA staff sought to identify and rank risks in 
four categories: cancer, non-cancer health, ecological, and welfare 
risks.91 The report noted that EPA’s resources better matched public 
perceptions of risk than the perceptions of EPA experts. The 
conclusions in the report have withstood the test of time surprisingly 
well. For example, the two most substantial ecological and welfare 
risks identified in the report were stratospheric ozone depletion and 
global warming.92 Global warming also was ranked fifth and 
stratospheric ozone depletion sixth on the list of 31 welfare risks 
evaluated.93 The 1990 Regulating Risk report by the EPA Science 
Advisory Board (SAB) reviewed the Unfinished Business report and 
largely supported its conclusions.94 As to climate, EPA and outside 
environmental experts thus identified the issue as a high priority 
concern as early as the mid- to late-1980s. 
 
 89. Kousky et al. recommend also explicitly researching institutional and behavioral 
obstacles that have prevented meaningful action thus far. See Kousky et al., supra note 27, at 26. 
 90. The publication of an annual regulatory plan and semiannual regulatory agenda play 
this role for many rulemakings and policy initiatives directed at micro-risks, but they are not 
designed to stimulate a broader identification and prioritization of efforts to address macro-
risks. See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY PLAN AND SEMIANNUAL 
REGULATORY AGENDA (2010), available at http://www.epa.gov/lawsregs/documents/ 
regagendabook-fall10.pdf. The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) also 
requires EPA and other government agencies to link goals more closely with activities and 
expenditures, but it does not address prioritization of regulatory resources at the macro-risk 
level. See Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285 
(1993) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5. U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., and 39 U.S.C.). 
 91. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT 
OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS (1987). 
 92. Id. at 48. 
 93. Id. at 55. 
 94. SCI. ADVISORY BD., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SAB-EC-90-021, REDUCING RISK: 
SETTING PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 4 (1990). 
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The subsequent climate science has only increased the relative 
priority warranted for carbon mitigation, but the preparation of 
reports identifying and prioritizing environmental risks has not 
continued. Perhaps most important, ground was lost in the response 
to the deregulatory momentum of the mid-1990s. For example, the 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) required the 
White House CEQ to prepare annual state of the environment 
reports to Congress and the President.95 These reports provided a 
starting point for evaluating the allocation of environmental risk-
reduction resources. Congress enacted the Federal Reports 
Elimination and Sunset Act (the Reports Elimination Act) in 1996, 
however, and it removed the NEPA report and many other reports 
from the dozens that agencies were required to submit to Congress.96 
Rather than viewing the NEPA presidential report requirement as an 
independent, viable requirement even after the Reports Elimination 
Act, CEQ ceased producing the report altogether.97 The NEPA 
report was a vehicle for matching risks to risk reduction resources 
that was lost. Ironically, by reducing policymakers’ focus on risk 
resource allocation, the loss of the NEPA report ultimately may have 
decreased the efficiency and increased the size of regulatory agencies. 
To increase the prospects for rational macro-risk management, 
the CEQ could revisit its interpretation of NEPA and the Reports 
Elimination Act, and could begin again to generate an annual state of 
the environment report for the president, even if Congress would 
rather not receive the report. Rather than just a summary of the state 
of the environment, the report each year could include an explicit 
identification and ranking of those risks that pose genuine societal-
level threats. Congress could mandate preparation of such a report, 
but, even if it does not, there is a good argument that CEQ still has 
 
 95. 42 U.S.C. § 4341 (1994) (repealed 2000) (requiring President to transmit to Congress 
annually an Environmental Quality Report which shall set forth “(1) the status and condition of 
the major natural, manmade, or altered environmental classes of the Nation, including, but not 
limited to, the air, the aquatic . . . and the terrestrial environment . . . ; (2) current and 
foreseeable trends in the quality, management and utilization of such environments”). For a 
discussion of this issue, see Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2085 (2005). 
 96. See Federal Reports Elimination and Sunset Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-66, § 3003(a), 
109 Stat. 707, 734. See also 42 U.S.C. § 4341 (2006) (noting termination of section 4341 
requirement of annual Environmental Quality Report to Congress). 
 97. Arguably, a separate provision of NEPA still requires a report to the President. See 42 
U.S.C. § 4344(7) (requiring Council “to report at least once each year to the President on the 
state and condition of the environment”). 
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the authority under NEPA despite the provisions of the Reports 
Elimination Act.98 
On a similar note, new legislation or executive branch policy 
could require preparation of a “Regulating Risk” report by 
government and non-government experts by the end of the first year 
of each new presidential term.99 To provide transparency on the 
differences between government and non-government experts’ 
assessment of risks and experts’ versus politicians’ views, the new 
approach could require that a version be prepared and made publicly 
available by the EPA SAB prior to OMB comment. The report could 
then be modified after receipt of comments by the public, OMB, 
CEQ, and other White House offices. Making the comments of all of 
these entities publicly available would help clarify the varying 
perceptions of risks by policymakers who are closer to direct electoral 
politics. Both perspectives are valuable, but an unflinching assessment 
of risks by experts who are insulated from politics may be necessary 
for the democratic process ultimately to yield rational risk 
management. If the implications of a risk assessment prevent it from 
being made and communicated to the public in an unbiased way at 
the outset, the opportunity for democratic debate and decision-
making may be lost. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
No one can know whether the financial meltdown of 2008 and 
2009 could have been prevented, but it is reasonable to have expected 
the top managers and directors of the major corporations that went 
bankrupt or survived only because of federal bailouts to have asked 
the hard questions when their employees were betting the company 
on perpetual growth in housing prices. Top government policymakers 
should have asked similar questions. At the very highest levels of 
 
 98. Reports that identify important risks are already a part of defense policy debates, and 
the Department of Defense discussed climate change in the most recent national security report.  
See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW REPORT, at iv (2010), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/qdr/QDR%20as%20of%2029JAN10%201600.pdf (noting that the 
“[r]ising demand for resources, rapid urbanization of littoral regions, the effects of climate 
change, the emergence of new strains of disease, and profound cultural and demographic 
tensions in several regions are just some of the trends whose complex interplay may spark or 
exacerbate future conflicts”). 
 99. For example, although GPRA has pushed agencies in the direction of measuring 
performance and aligning performance with congressional directives and micro-risks to some 
extent, GPRA has not induced agencies or the political process to better align resource 
allocations with macro-risks. 
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business and government, someone should have been asking: What 
will be the impact of these derivatives if housing prices level off or 
decline? Is a leveling off of housing prices impossible or simply an 
event that has not occurred in the time horizon included in the risk 
assessment models? How much will we lose? If the losses have been 
hedged, who are the hedging parties and why do we think they will be 
solvent if the economy is in the tank? 
We now know that on occasion some individuals raised these 
issues. Yet the party continued despite whatever concerns they may 
have raised. Perhaps the rewards of ignoring the risk discouraged 
many from asking tough questions and enabled those who profited in 
the near term to marginalize those who asked tough questions, 
whether in board rooms or in government. 
The top White House and congressional leaders play a similar 
role as to climate change. A rational macro-risk regulation system 
should induce these key gatekeepers to ask and to act upon the 
answers to questions such as the following: What is the likelihood of 
catastrophic climate outcomes? Are there tipping points that might 
be passed beyond which emissions reductions will be largely 
ineffective? When might they occur? To what extent does the output 
of an IAM or the social cost of carbon reflect plausible catastrophic 
outcomes? What is the effect on model outputs if climate change 
causes negative economic growth? What are the implications of a 
range of discount rates for valuing all economic activity in 2100? 
2200? 2300? It is reasonable for the public to expect that key 
policymakers are asking these types of questions. 
Even if the hard questions are asked, it is not possible for the risk 
management process to ensure that top policymakers will make 
rational and unbiased decisions. But it is essential for the risk 
assessment process to provide the information necessary for rational 
decision-making to occur. Perhaps one indicator of a society that 
responds rationally to risk is that it is able to learn from its mistakes. 
To date, the jury is out on whether the next forty years of 
environmental policymaking will demonstrate the level of rational 
risk regulation concerning macro-risks that we have seen regarding 
micro-risks, or whether the climate meltdown will simply mature 
more slowly than the financial meltdown. 
 
